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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JOSE RICHARD QUINTANA,

Case No. 900264-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.
INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT
This brief is filed pursuant to Rule 24(c), Utah R.
App. P., in reply to the State's response brief.
It should first be noted that the State, in its brief,
has elected not to respond in any way to the arguments defendant
raised in the Brief of Appellant.

Thus, it should now be assumed

by this Court that defendant's arguments and authorities
asserting that the trial court failed to comply with the strict
standards of Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, (
in accepting defendant's plea, are well taken.

Specifically,

unopposed and not responded to are defendant's arguments that the
trial court:

(1)

Failed to enumerate defendant's constitutional

rights in accepting his plea; (2) failed to advise him that he
could be sentenced consecutively for firearms enhancement; and
(3) failed to advise him that he could receive a sentence running
consecutively to the sentence he was presently serving.
The sum total of these errors and omissions is that
defendant's guilty plea was involuntary and unknowing and

improperly received and, therefore, should be set aside.

Failure

to properly and completely adhere to Rule 11 results in a
defective plea which must be set aside upon proper motion by
defendant.

State v. Gibbon, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah, 1987), State v.

Valencia, 776 P.2d 1332 (Utah App., 1989), and State v. Smith,
777 P.2d 464 (Utah, 1989).
The sole issue raised by the State (and raised for the
first time on appeal) is that of jurisdiction.

The State alleges

that although there was no statute of limitation on withdrawal of
guilty pleas at the time defendant entered his plea, a subsequent
change in the statute which imposed a thirty-day limitation
should have prohibited the lower court from even hearing the
merits of defendant's claims.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
It is defendant's position that the provisions of §7713-6, Utah Code Ann., (as amended, 1989), which allegedly require
that a motion to withdraw guilty plea be made within thirty days
of the entry of the plea, is not jurisdictional.

That statute

must be read in conjunction and harmony with the provisions of
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which was also amended
in 1989.

Rule 11(6) makes clear that the thirty-day period is

not a hard and fast 'bright line' with which to gauge the
timeliness of a motion to withdraw guilty plea, but is rather a
period which can be extended and enlarged by a court.
It is defendant's contention that the lower court
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impliedly, if not necessarily, did, in fact, extend the time for
raising the motion to withdraw the plea.

If the court can, in

its discretion, enlarge the time period, it clearly would not be
jurisdictional.
Further, it is defendant's contention that the rigid
application of the thirty-day limitation to cases such as
defendant's is unconstitutional, inasmuch as it denies the
defendant's right to due process and his constitutional freedom
from the application of ejc post facto laws.
ARGUMENT
I
THE THIRTY-DAY TIME LIMIT FOR WITHDRAWING
A GUILTY PLEA NOW CONTAINED IN §77-13-6,
UTAH CODE ANN., (AS AMENDED, 1989), IS NOT
JURISDICTIONAL
§77-13-6(2), Utah Code Ann., (as amended, 1989)
provides as follows:
(a) A plea of guilty or no contest may be
withdrawn only upon good cause shown and with
leave of the court.
(b) A request to
guilty or no contest
shall be made within
the plea. [Emphasis

withdraw a plea of
is made by motion, and
30 days after entry of
added.]

The provision which imposes a thirty-day limitation on
motions to withdraw guilty pleas is a new amendment to the former
statute and became effective April 24, 1989.
examined by this Court.

It has not yet been

At the time defendant entered his guilty

plea in 1988, there was no statutory time period with regard to
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such motions.

The statute at that time read as follows:

A plea

of not guilty may be withdrawn at any time prior to conviction.
A plea of guilty or no contest may be withdrawn only upon good
cause shown and with leave of [the] court."

§77-13-6, Utah Code

Ann., (as amended, 1980).
The sole position taken by the State in their response
brief is that the amended statute is jurisdictional.

In order

for a statute to be jurisdictional, it must be clear and definite
as to its terms and restrictions.

Statutes of limitation are

almost always jurisdictional because they usually set clear
'bright lines1 by which certain actions must be taken.

If a

litigant does not act within the time period set forth, the court
is without jurisdiction to hear his claims, no matter how much
merit they may have.
§77-13-6, Utah Code Ann., (as amended, 1989), despite
its appearance on its face, does not set a definite thirty-day
period by which a motion must be filed or the court loses
jurisdiction.

Rule 11(6), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure (as

amended, 1989), provides as follows:
Failure to advise the defendant of the time
limits for filing any motion to withdraw a
guilty plea or no contest is not a ground for
setting the plea aside, but may be the ground
for extending the time to make a motion under
§77-13-6.
The new Rule 11(6) makes it clear that the court has
authority to extend the time for making a motion under §77-13-6.
If the thirty-day period was intended as jurisdictional, the
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court would not have the power to extend the period and, thus,
enlarge its own jurisdiction.

The mere fact that the court on

its own, or upon motion, may extend the time period indicates
that it is a flexible period that can be expanded by the court to
avoid manifest injustice such as would arise when a defendant was
not informed of the thirty-day period.
Just such a case is presented here.

It is undisputed

that at the time defendant's plea was accepted, he was not
informed of any time period by which he must file a motion to
withdraw his plea.

This is true for the simple fact that there

was no time limitation on motions to withdraw pleas at that time.
Under Rule 11 as it now exits, the court has an affirmative
obligation to instruct the defendant as to the time period in
which a motion to withdraw his plea must be made.

Under the

present Rule 11(6), the failure to inform the defendant of the
time period is not, in itself, grounds for setting aside his
plea, but it is grounds for not imposing the thirty-day time
period.
Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea was
argued at the lower court level where the State was represented
by able and capable legal counsel.

Although the new thirty-day

limitation period imposed by the 1989 amendment to §77-13-6,
could have been raised by the court or any of the parties, it was
not.

It is undisputed that the statute in effect at the time

defendant filed his motion to withdraw his plea contained the
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thirty-day limitation, yet none of the parties or the court felt
it was controlling.

Now, for the first time, the State, after a

full evidentiary hearing at the lower court level, raises this
issue on appeal.
It is difficult to understand how the lower court and
the parties could have overlooked this seemingly controlling
statute which would have disposed of the defendant's motion
summarily and without the need for an evidentiary hearing or the
additional findings which were prepared by the court.

It should

not be assumed that the court was ignorant of the statute or that
the parties overlooked it.

While the record is not clear, the

only explanation which makes sense is that the court implicitly
found that defendant, having entered his plea when there was no
statutory time limit and having not been previously informed or
notified by the court of this new potential limitation on his
rights, implicitly extended the time for the taking of his
motion.

This argument takes on added weight when one considers,

as argued below, that strict application of that time period in
defendant's case would be unconstitutional.

Any other

interpretation assumes gross ignorance of the law on the part of
the trial court and incompetence of State's counsel at the
hearing level.
Should this Court have any doubt as to whether the
lower court intended to expand the time period for withdrawing a
plea (assuming the new time period is even applicable in this
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case), it should remand this matter to the lower court for just
such a determination, rather than deny this appeal based on
jurisdictional grounds with an unclear record.

This is

especially true when this issue has been raised by the State for
the first time on appeal and the lower court has thus been
deprived of the opportunity to consider it.

II
THE APPLICATION OF THE THIRTY-DAY LIMITATION
ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF GUILTY PLEAS, IN CASES
SUCH AS AT BAR, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL
As has been argued above, when defendant entered his
guilty plea and was sentenced, there was no time limitation,
either by statute, rule, or decision, limiting the time within
which he could bring a motion to withdraw his plea.
However, on April 24, 1989, an amendment to §77-13-6
went into effect, imposing a thirty-day limitation within which
motions to withdraw guilty pleas must be made.

That thirty-day

period began to run at the time the plea was entered.

Thus, on

its face, the moment the statute became effective, all pleas
entered more than thirty days before the amendment would become
final and not subject to motions to withdraw.
The amended statute, by completely eliminating the
right to set aside pleas entered more than thirty days prior,
operates very much like a statue of repose which was declared
unconstitutional in Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 683
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(Utah, 1985).
The statute itself does not evidence any intent that it
be applied retroactively to pleas entered before its enactment
date.

Utah law is clear that statutes are not applied

retroactively unless they expressly so declare.

§68-3-3, Utah

Code Ann., (1953, as amended), provides as follows:

"No part of

these revised statutes is retroactive, unless expressly so
declared."
To apply a criminal statute retroactively would
constitute an e£ post facto law which is violative of Article 1,
Section 10, of the Constitution of the United States, as well as
Article I, Section 18, of the Utah Constitution, and runs
contrary to long established prohibitions.
U.S. 167 (1925).

Beazell v. Ohio, 269

There does not appear to be any difference in

the nature or the scope of the prohibition under either the
federal Constitution or the Utah Constitution.
The ex post facto prohibition contained in both the
federal and state Constitutions is based on consideration of
notice and fair warning and, thus, although it is a separate
constitutional protection, its intent and the cases interpreting
it all deal with language and concepts similar to due process and
equal protection.
The United States Supreme Court has recently ruled in
regards to £x post facto statutes.

In Miller v. Florida, 482

U.S. 423, 107 S.Ct. 2446, 96 L.Ed. 2d 351 (1987), the Court
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noted:
Our understanding of what is meant by £x post
facto largely derives from the case of Calder
v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L.ED. 648 (1798), in
which this Court first considered the scope
of the ex_ post facto prohibition. In Calder,
Justice Chase ... summarized his understanding of what fell within the words and
intent of the prohibition: 1st. Every law
that makes an action done before the passing
of the law, and which was innocent when done,
criminal; and punishes such action. 2d.
Every law that aggravates a crime or makes it
greater than it was, when committed. 3d.
Every law that changes the punishment, and
inflicts a greater punishment, than the law
annexed to the crime, when committed. 4th
Every law that alters the legal rules of
evidence, and receives less, or different
testimony than the law required at the time
of the commission of the offense, in order to
convict the offender. Id., at 423.
[Emphasis omitted.]
[Citations omitted.]
Under Miller, in order to fall within the eit post facto
prohibition, two critical elements must be present:

"...first,

the law 'must be retrospective, that is, it must apply to events
occurring before its enactment'; and second, 'it must
disadvantage the offender affected by it.'"

Id., at 423.

The

application of the Miller test clearly reveals that the 1989
amendment to §77-13-6 is an ex_ post facto provision as it is, on
its face, retroactive and is most clearly disadvantageous to
offenders such as defendant, who find their ability to bring such
motions eliminated overnight and without notice.
The State, in apparent anticipation of this
constitutional argument, has argued that the amendment imposing
the thirty-day limitation should be viewed as procedural in
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nature and that "a procedural change is not j^x post facto even
though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant."
Utah, 110, U.S. 574, 4 S.Ct. 202, 28 L.Ed 262 (1884).

Hopt v.
The

fallacy of the State's argument is that it focuses only on the
form of the statute and does not look at the nature of the right
affected.

The United States Supreme Court, in Miller, made this

distinction clear when it held:
...no e>x post facto violation occurs if the
change in the law is merely procedural and
does not increase the punishment, nor change
the ingredients of the offense or the
ultimate facts necessary to establish
guilt... On the other hand, a change in the
law that alters a substantial right can be ex
post facto even if the statute takes a
seemingly procedural form. Id., at 424.
[Emphasis added.) [Citations omitted.]
In like regard is Weaver v. Graham, 101 S.Ct. 960, 450
U.S. 24, 67 L.Ed. 2d. 17 (1981), where the Court held, in regards
to procedural/substantive distinction, that, "It is the effect,
not the form of the law which determines whether it is ex^ post
facto."
The focus thus should be on the form of the statute and
whether a substantial right of a criminal defendant has been
effected.

"A procedure change which does not injuriously effect

a substantial right to which the accused was entitled as of the
time of his offense is not ex^ post facto though retroactive; but
is otherwise if it does deprive him of a substantial right."

W.

LeFave & A. Scott, Jr., "Substantive Criminal Law," 141 (West,
1986).
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Clearly, defendant has been denied a substantial right.
At the time of his sentencing, he had the right, unrestricted by
time, to withdraw his guilty plea upon a showing of good cause.
After the enactment of the 1989 amendment, he no longer had that
right because he had entered his plea more than thirty days prior
to the enactment of the statute.

While the statute would clearly

be procedural as to future defendants and arguably procedural as
to defendants whose thirty days had not run, it is quite clearly
substantive as to defendants whose rights have been entirely
eliminated by the statute.

Their procedural rights as to the

time period in which a motion should be filed is not effected,
bur rather they are denied the substantive right to even file
such a motion.
The State, in response, quotes Vealey v. Clegg, 579
P.2d 919 (Utah, 1978), for the proposition that, "limitation
statutes ... are but procedural matters and are not
constitutionally protected if they do not adversely effect vested
rights."

Id., at 920.

The Vealey court, however, carefully

conditioned this right upon the allowance of a grace period:
...The law is all settled that statutes
effecting limitation may be amended and
shortened without impinging on any
constitutional rights of a party, provided
always that a sufficient period of grace is
allowed to enable a plaintiff to maintain his
cause of action if he will follow the new
law... Id. [Emphasis added.]
The State, in reference to the language regarding a
grace period, boldly asserts that, "While the Vealey court spoke
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of a grace period to allow a plaintiff to maintain his cause of
action, that exact proviso is not required in all cases."
of Appellee at p. 6.

Brief

No case authority is cited for that

extraordinary and unwarranted conclusion.

The Vealey court quite

clearly stated that a "sufficient period of grace" must "always"
be provided.

Such a result is in harmony with the Utah Supreme

Court's prior ruling in Greenhalgh v. Payson City, 530 P.2d 799
(Utah, 1975), where the Court held as follows:
It is well established that the legislature
may reduce a period of limitations and apply
a new and shorter period to previously
accrued causes of action, so long as a
reasonable time is allowed to bring such an
action; and that the effect of the new
statute commences upon the effective date of
the statute. The result of this is actually
prospective in that the statutory change
relates to procedure to occur in the future.
Thus the plaintiffs had two years from the
effective date of this statute or until May
11, 1973, to assert their cause of action.
This, coupled with the previously elapsed
time, gave them forty plus months. So the
period of the bringing of their action was
shortened by a little over seven months; and
the time available to them to bring their
action after the new statute of limitations
amply meets the requirement of allowing them
reasonable time in which to do so. Id., at
803. [Citations omitted.]
In this case, in sharp contrast to Greenhalgh, no grace
period was provided.

With the 1989 amendment to §77-13-6, all

pleas, entered more than thirty days prior to the effective date
of the statute, became final and could not be subject to a motion
to withdraw.

Had the statute provided a grace period of even

thirty days with appropriate notice for all prior pleas as well
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as thirty days for prospective cases, it would pass constitutional muster on the ex^ post facto basis.

However, the complete

avoidance of that issue makes the statute constitutionally
defective.
CONCLUSION
Because the court did not strictly comply with Rule 11,
the lower court had jurisdiction over defendant's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.

The State, by its silence, has

conceded that the requirements of Rule 11 were not followed in
this case.

Such an error mandates allowing defendant to withdraw

his plea of guilty.

To hold otherwise ignores the purpose of

Rule 11 and results in manifest injustice.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTEJKthjfS g^r^Zay

of May, 1991.

LE L. MOWER
itTtorney for Defendant/Appellant
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